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Do private analysts coordinate their forecasts via central bank forecasts? In this 
paper, we examine private and central bank forecasts for the Czech Republic. The 
evolution of the standard deviation of private forecasts as well as the distance 
from the central bank’s forecasts are used to study whether a coordination effect 
exists, how it is influenced by uncertainty, and the effects of changes in central 
bank communication. The results suggest that private analysts coordinate their 
forecasts for the interest rate and inflation, while no or limited evidence exists for 
the exchange rate and GDP growth. 
 
 
JEL Codes:   E27, E37, E47, E58. 
Keywords:  Central bank, coordination, forecast.
                                                           
* Jan Filáček: Czech National Bank, Monetary and Statistics Department, Na Příkopě 28, Prague 1, 115 03, 
Czech Republic. Corresponding author (email: jan.filacek@cnb.cz). 
Branislav Saxa: Czech National Bank, Monetary and Statistics Department, Na Příkopě 28, Prague 1, 115 03, 
Czech Republic (e-mail: branislav.saxa@cnb.cz ).  
This work was supported by Czech National Bank Research Project No. A4/2009. The authors would like to 
thank referees and participants at the interim and final seminars at the Czech National Bank for their helpful 
discussions and comments. All errors and omissions are ours. The views expressed in the paper are the views of 
authors and do not necessarily represent the view of the affiliated institution. 
 
 2   Jan Filáček, Branislav Saxa 
 
   
Nontechnical summary 
Central bank transparency has become one of the most prominent features of monetary policy-
making over the last two decades. Central banks have enhanced their transparency in many 
respects. In this regard, the publication of central bank forecasts is of the utmost importance. 
Forecasts contain complex information about the central bank’s assessment of the current state of 
the economy and its vision of future economic development. Further, forecasts are usually a 
benchmark against which a decision-making body evaluates risks and makes a final decision. In 
this paper we focus on another important aspect of publishing central bank forecasts – its 
coordination role for the forecasts of private agents. 
We started our analysis by studying spreads among private agent forecasts before and after the 
central bank’s forecast is published. We proceeded by scrutinizing the distance of the private 
forecasts from the central bank’s forecast. Finally, we checked the effects of enhanced 
transparency and overall macroeconomic uncertainty on this distance. In this step, we also took 
into account risk assessments made by the board members, the forecasts of the Ministry of 
Finance and actual economic developments and statistical releases in the period between two 
central bank forecasts. Our paper draws on the historical forecasts of key macroeconomic 
variables in the Czech Republic. 
The main hypotheses under our review are: (1) financial market analysts tend to coordinate their 
forecasts via the Czech National Bank (CNB) forecast, (2) this coordination depends also on 
macroeconomic uncertainty, and (3) improvements in CNB communication have deepened the 
coordination effect. 
The results suggest that private analysts coordinate their forecasts via the CNB forecast for 
interest rate and inflation forecasts, while no or limited evidence exists in the case of the exchange 
rate and GDP growth. We find that private forecasts are closer to the CNB forecast in times of 
high uncertainty for the interest rate and the exchange rate. Finally, improvements in CNB 
communication, mainly its interest rate forecast publication, had positive effects in the cases of 




Central bank transparency has become one of the most prominent features of monetary policy-
making over the last two decades. Central banks have enhanced their transparency in many 
respects. Publishing minutes and votes cast, describing the outlook for the economy and its risks, 
commenting on statistical releases and other disclosures have all become a part of a central 
bankers’ daily job. In this regard, the publication of central bank forecasts is of the utmost 
importance.
1 These forecasts contain complex information about the central bank’s assessment of 
the current state of the economy and its vision of future economic development. This vision 
usually, and increasingly, includes the reaction of the central bank and sends an important signal 
to market participants on the future stance of monetary policy. Forecasts are also usually a 
benchmark against which the decision-making body evaluates risks and makes a final decision. In 
this paper we focus on another important aspect of publishing the central bank forecast – its 
coordination role for private agents’ expectations and forecasts. 
The expectations of financial market participants are very important for any central bank. If 
private expectations are broadly in line with central bank expectations, the central bank has a 
check that its communication has been properly understood and that its vision has been conveyed 
properly to the financial markets. If, however, private expectations differ significantly from the 
central bank forecast, the vision of the central bank might have been communicated badly or 
might even have been disbelieved. In either case, central banks should be worried – if the 
financial market does not share the vision, then the vision is less likely to materialize. It is mainly 
for this purpose that the majority of central banks collect the expectations of private economists.  
 
2. Literature Review 
There is an extensive literature covering the field of information asymmetry between a central 
bank and the public. Since the seminal paper of Kydland and Prescott (1977), which favoured 
symmetric (policy rule) to asymmetric information (discretional policy), many papers have dealt 
with the issue. Several different types of asymmetries in the information sets of a central bank and 
the public can be identified. Most attention has been paid to the asymmetry regarding central bank 
objectives and asymmetries regarding economic shocks hitting the economy. 
A central bank forecast, if it includes central bank rules, contains information on both central bank 
objectives and economic shocks. Therefore, many papers use the disclosure of central bank 
forecasts as an illustrative example of how information asymmetry between a central bank and the 
public might be removed and what the economic effects of such a step would be. Unfortunately, 
the conclusions of these papers are rather ambiguous, and depend on the frameworks and 
assumptions used.  
                                                           
1 The first central bank to publish its forecast was the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1985 (RBNZ, 1985). 
Since then, the publication of central bank forecasts for inflation and real economic activity has become standard 
practice. Some central banks go further and also publish interest rate and exchange rate forecasts. 4   Jan Filáček, Branislav Saxa 
 
   
For example, Jensen (2000), using a New-Keynesian model with unobserved output, shows that 
publishing forecasts of current shocks on the one hand solves the credibility problem, but on the 
other distorts the stabilization policy of a central bank. Cukierman (2001) arrives at a similar 
conclusion in Neo-Keynesian and Neo-monetarist set-ups. However, Fukač (2006), in a New 
Keynesian framework with adaptive learning, finds that a central bank has a more difficult job in 
stabilizing an economy with heterogeneous expectations than in stabilizing an economy with 
homogeneous expectations. In Geraats (2001), the public observes neither economic shocks, nor 
the inflation target. In this framework, she finds that revealing the central bank forecast enhances 
the central bank’s reputation, reduces the inflation bias and gives the central bank greater 
flexibility to respond to shocks in the economy. The disclosure of future shocks in the New-
Keynesian framework has been analysed, for example, by Eijffinger and Tesfaselassie (2007). 
The conclusion of their analysis is that the advance disclosure of future shocks does not improve 
wealth, but might impair the stabilization of inflation and output.  
 All the above literature assumed heterogeneity between central bank and private information, but 
private agents were assumed to share the same set of public information. Morris and Shin (2002) 
were the first to extend the analysis of revealing central bank information for heterogeneity among 
private agents. Each economic agent might differ in her information set and in her expectations. 
Allowing for different information sets or beliefs among the public gives an additional role to the 
release of central bank information: that of serving as a coordination device. Publishing forecasts 
might motivate market participants to coordinate their beliefs based on the central bank’s forecast.  
Coordination can be motivated by the same factors, as Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) suggest 
in their overview of herd behaviour in financial markets. As they argue, market participants can 
rationally imitate the others, because the others might have some information not available to 
everybody. Compensation schemes are set so that rewards are based on performance relative to 
the rest of the market or simply because market participants have a preference for conformity and 
they do not want to take an extreme position. Herd behaviour can appear without central banks 
publishing their forecasts at all. However, transparent communication from a central bank that 
includes the publication of forecasts can potentially trigger herd behaviour with the central bank 
forecast being used as a coordination tool.  
Morris and Shin (2002) show that if private agents coordinate their actions they tend to put more 
weight on the public signal than is justified by the level of its precision. Too much attention paid 
to public signals is harmful, because they crowd out private signals. Private agents lose incentives 
to gather their own information (make their own forecasts) and as a consequence, private 
expectations might diverge from the fundamentals. 
In a response to Morris and Shin (2002), Svensson (2006) advocates greater transparency. He 
shows that more public signals enhance welfare within a reasonable range of model parameters. In 
fact, publishing central bank forecasts might be welfare reducing only if (a) agents put majority 
weight on coordination, and (b) central bank signals (forecasts) are more than eight times as noisy 
as private signals (forecasts). The second assumption in particular is highly unlikely, given the 
efforts of central banks to collect, process and analyse data about the economy.  Central Bank Forecasts as a Coordination Device   5 
 
 
Given these opposing views on the welfare effects of publishing central bank forecasts, the results 
of empirical studies on coordination are highly beneficial in deciding whether central banks 
should release more signals. Several empirical papers have been written on this issue.  
Bauer, Eisenbeis, Waggoner and Zha (2006) used cross-sectional data to decompose the forecast 
accuracy of U.S. financial market participants into two components: common errors that affect all 
forecasters, and idiosyncratic errors, which reflect the different views across the forecasters. They 
found that since the FOMC began to release statements accompanying changes in the monetary 
policy instrument in 1994, idiosyncratic shocks have been reduced, implying that the expectations 
of individual forecasters have become more synchronized. However, they did not find evidence 
that common errors have become smaller since 1994. They conclude that common errors seem to 
be associated with the business cycle and economic shocks. As such, they can hardly be improved 
by transparent monetary policy. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) empirically tested for the effects of the relative accuracy of public 
and private signals on the efficiency of central bank communication. To proxy for this efficiency, 
the authors used two measures – a measure of the short-term predictability of central bank board 
decisions as well as a measure of medium-term predictability. The surprise component of interest 
rate decisions was used to proxy short-term predictability, with medium-term predictability being 
proxied by the dispersion of the private forecasts of interest rates. The dispersion and quantity of 
statements by individual board members as well as their impact on market interest rates were used 
as proxies for public signals. Finally, the dispersion of market forecasts for inflation and GDP 
along with the volatility of market interest rates were used to proxy for private signals. Their 
estimates on U.S. data confirmed that precise signals from the bank improved the predictability of 
central bank decisions, whereas dispersed signals worsen the predictability. Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher also found that central bank signals are more effective in cases of high market 
uncertainty. 
Cecchetti (2009) scrutinized the effects of inflation targeting on the dispersion of private 
forecasts. Using panel data from 15 countries over 20 years, Cecchetti finds little evidence that 
inflation targeting leads to any reduced dispersion of the private forecasts of inflation – the impact 
of adopting inflation targeting is only significant for a few countries and is always small. 
Fujiwara (2005) exploits the data on central bank and private forecasts in Japan, where central 
bank forecasts are published twice a year. The results suggest that private forecasters are 
influenced by the central bank forecasts. No influence is found in the opposite direction, though 
this might be a result of the low number of observations. 
In the most recent piece of research in this area, Ehrmann, Eijffinger and Fratzscher (2010) 
confront the dispersion of private forecasts with different aspects of central bank transparency, 
including the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) transparency index and the publication of inflation 
and GDP forecasts. They conclude that transparency has a significant and sizeable effect on 
forecast dispersion by announcing a target, other forms of communication, or by publishing 
inflation and GDP forecasts. 
Focusing on the Czech Republic, numerous papers have been published analysing the effects of 
Czech National Bank (CNB) communication (e.g. Böhm, Král and Saxa, 2009, Bulíř et al., 2007). 6   Jan Filáček, Branislav Saxa 
 
   
However, the issue of coordination between the central bank and private forecasts has been 
neglected so far. Navrátil and Kotlán (2005) dealt marginally with the coordination issue, 
analysing the behaviour of the differentials between market interest rates and the CNB’s interest 
rate forecasts. They found that market rates converged toward the CNB’s interest rate trajectory in 
five cases out of eight. However, because of a limited number of observations, they questioned the 
robustness of their findings.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
This paper expands on the existing literature in at least three respects. First, we look at the 
coordination problem from a closer perspective, analysing the responses of individual private 
forecasters to released central bank forecasts. Second, we not only look at the dispersion of 
private forecasts, but also examine how distant private forecasts are from the central bank 
forecast. Third, we focus on the details of central bank forecast communication by taking into 
account the risk assessment as viewed by the board members and by inspecting the effects of 
communication improvements. 
We start our analysis by studying the spreads among private agent forecasts before and after the 
central bank’s forecast is published. We proceed by scrutinizing the distance of the private 
forecasts from the central bank forecast. Finally, we check the effects of enhanced transparency 
and overall macroeconomic uncertainty on the distance. In this step, we also take into account the 
risk assessments made by the board members, the forecasts of the Ministry of Finance and the 
actual economic developments and statistical releases in the period between two central bank 
forecasts. Our paper draws on the historical forecasts of key macroeconomic variables in the 
Czech Republic. 
The main hypotheses under our review are: (1) financial market analysts tend to coordinate their 
forecasts for the Czech economy via the CNB forecast, (2) this coordination also depends on 
macroeconomic uncertainty, and (3) improvements in CNB communication have deepened the 
coordination effect.  
 
3.1 Data 
The empirical testing of our hypotheses was made using data from the Czech Republic. The CNB 
introduced inflation targeting in 1998 and since then has ranked among the most transparent 
central banks – the Czech Republic ranks 4
th among 100 countries in the central bank 
transparency rankings constructed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2007). The CNB forecast is 
released quarterly at the beginning of February, May, August and November.
2 The CNB forecasts 
are disclosed immediately after the monetary policy-related board meetings. Besides the forecast 
for headline inflation, monetary policy relevant inflation (headline inflation adjusted for the direct 
effects of indirect taxes) and real GDP growth, the interest rate and the exchange rate consistent 
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with the forecast are also published. All modelling apparatus, including all equations and 
assumptions, is also made public.  
In this paper we use a sample of the CNB’s forecasts published between July 2002 and March 
2010. Prior to July 2002, the forecasts were based on the assumption of a stable interest rate and, 
because of this, they cannot be directly compared with private forecasts, which inherently 
anticipate changes in interest rates. When searching for possible coordination, we focus on four 
key macroeconomic indicators – headline CPI inflation, real GDP growth, the short-term interest 
rate (3M PRIBOR) and the CZK/EUR nominal exchange rate. The forecast consists of quarterly 
forecasted figures, up to seven quarters ahead. In this paper we compare the inflation, interest rate 
and exchange rate forecasts for the one-year horizon and GDP forecasts for the current and next 
year.  
Whereas the CNB forecasts for inflation and GDP started to be published shortly after the 
introduction of inflation targeting in 1998, the interest rate forecast has not been published using 
figures before January 2008 and the exchange rate forecast was not published before January 
2009. However, verbal descriptions of interest rate and exchange rate forecasts have been 
provided since July 2002. Thus, we find it useful to look at the coordination effects of interest rate 
and exchange rate forecasts throughout the period and check for any breaks after the forecasts had 
been published using full details.  
For private forecasts we used the data from a survey among financial market participants called 
Financial Market Inflation Expectations. This monthly survey is conducted among both domestic 
and foreign-based private economists active in the Czech financial sector. The answers for the 
survey are collected approximately in the middle of the month. 
As with the CNB forecasts, we are interested in private forecasts for four key macroeconomic 
indicators – inflation, the interest rate
3 and the exchange rate at the one-year horizon, and GDP 
growth in the current and next year. We use monthly data, looking at the behaviour of private 
forecasts before and after the release of the central bank forecast. Besides employing a median 
forecast, we also use individual responses to calculate the standard deviation of individual 
forecasts in each month, i.e. 
 













                                                           
3 Whereas the CNB interest rate forecast is in terms of 3-month market interest rates (3M PRIBOR), analysts are 
surveyed on interest rates in terms of 2-week repo rates and 12M PRIBOR. We use the 2W repo rate and assume 
that the spread between 2-week and 3-month interest rates is stable and close to zero. This assumption was fully 
satisfied before autumn 2008. With the outbreak of the financial crisis the spread between 2-week and 3-month interest 
rates widened significantly. However, it is reasonable to assume that the forecasted spread at the one-year horizon 
remained relatively small.  8   Jan Filáček, Branislav Saxa 
 
   
where 
F
i X is the forecast of the i-th private forecaster and n is the number of private forecasters 
participating in the survey in a given round. Typically, about 10–15 respondents take part in the 
survey, with the vast majority of them being based in the Czech Republic.
4 
The CNB and median private forecasts of the interest rate, inflation and the exchange rate at the 
one-year horizon as well as the current and next year GDP growth forecasts are displayed in 
Figures 1 to 5, along with the evolution of the standard deviations of the individual forecasts. 
 
 









Jan02 Jan04 Jan06 Jan08 Jan10
 
CNB's forecast                                                 
Median of private forecasts














                                                           
4 Because there are usually only one or two foreign-based respondents in each round of the survey, we do not 
have enough observations to run a separate estimation for foreign-based analysts, although this estimation could 
have brought us some interesting insights.  Central Bank Forecasts as a Coordination Device   9 
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To test our first hypothesis, i.e., the hypothesis that financial market analysts coordinate their 
forecasts of the Czech economy via the CNB forecast, we analyse three sets of monthly private 
forecasts for each release of the quarterly CNB forecast. The first set of private forecasts 
comprises the last available forecasts before each release of the quarterly CNB forecast. The 
second set are those private forecasts which are surveyed immediately after the release of the 
CNB forecast. The third set of private forecasts are the forecasts surveyed approximately one 
month after the release of the CNB forecast. 
We calculate two indicators for each set: the standard deviation of the private forecasts and the 
median absolute distance from the CNB forecast. Subsequently, we analyse the average evolution 
of the standard deviation of the private forecasts over the period of one month before and two 
months after the CNB forecast release. To take into account the decreasing uncertainty 
surrounding current and next year GDP forecasts, we regress the standard deviation on three time 
dummies (last before, first after, second after) as well as a decreasing trend variable controlling 
for the calendar effect. Besides a graphical representation of the forecast standard deviation 
evolution, we test the null hypothesis of no change in the standard deviation of the financial 
market forecasts after the release of the CNB forecast against the alternative hypothesis of an 
increase or decrease in the standard  










Ffm S D is the average of the differences between the standard deviation of private forecasts 
before and after the release of the CNB forecast. The same sequence of steps is performed for the 
distance from the CNB forecast. 
We proceed by testing the second hypothesis, which states that the coordination effect depends on 
the macroeconomic uncertainty. It is based on the expectation that private forecasters stick to the 
CNB forecast more tightly at times of higher uncertainty. To proxy the uncertainty, we calculate 
the three-month average of the standard deviations of the individual private forecasts (i.e., the 
cross-sectional standard deviations) for each forecasted variable and for each quarter. Based on 
the comparison of the standard deviations in each quarter with the average standard deviation over 
the whole sample, the low and high uncertainty quarters are defined for each variable. 
As an alternative to the uncertainty proxy defined individually for each variable, we also define 
overall uncertainty. This is the sum of the standard deviations of the individual private forecasts of 
all five variables considered, where the time series of standard deviations for all variables are 
standardized before adding them up: 
 12   Jan Filáček, Branislav Saxa 
 
   
=
stnd





j i Ffm j i Ffm
j
























k t Ffm s  
where,  j t Ffm s , , is the standard deviation of the individual private forecasts for variable j at time t 
and lj is the length of the time series for variable j. The same applies for the distance from the 
CNB forecast. 
As with the previous definition of uncertainty, we define quarters in which the uncertainty is 
below or at the average as being low uncertainty quarters. Similarly, quarters with uncertainty 
above the average are high uncertainty quarters. 
Finally, we test the hypothesis that improvements in CNB communication have deepened the 
coordination effect. The way the CNB forecasts were communicated was different for the 
different variables and changed over time. For example, interest rate and exchange rate forecasts 
were described verbally before 2008, whereas inflation and GDP forecasts were published using 
figures. As there are different communication methods for different variables and periods we can 
evaluate the impact of enhanced communication on the coordination effect. This is done in two 
ways: first, we contrast the strength of the coordination effect for each variable with how its 
forecast was communicated by the CNB. Second, the changes in the communication of forecasts 
for particular variables over time are used to compare the coordination effects before and after the 
change (e.g., the start of interest rate forecast publication using fan charts in January 2008). The 
effect of improved communication is estimated by adding dummy variables into the regressions. 
The changes in CNB communication are expected to deepen the coordination effect, but we 
cannot  a priori rule out the opposite result. As Mishkin (2004) pointed out, increased 
transparency, for example, announcing a projection of the policy rate path, might complicate 
communication with the public and could hurt the central bank’s credibility. 
 
4. Results 
We start answering the question of whether the variability of individual private forecasts is 
smaller when the CNB forecast is released by examining the standard deviations of the individual 
forecasts before and after the CNB forecast is released. The first column of each graph in Figure 6 
depicts the standard deviation of the individual forecasts in the last survey before the release of 
the CNB forecast. The second column depicts the standard deviation of the individual forecasts 
immediately after the CNB forecast is released. Finally, the third column shows the standard 
deviation approximately one month after the CNB forecast is released.  
 Central Bank Forecasts as a Coordination Device   13 
 
 
Figure 6: The Evolution of the Average Standard Deviation of Private Forecasts before and            
































































In the cases of interest rates and inflation, the standard deviation of private forecasts is smallest 
immediately after the release of the CNB forecast and then increases. In the case of exchange 
rates, the standard deviation is highest after the release and then decreases. Similarly, the standard 
deviation of the GDP forecasts for the current and next year increases after the CNB forecast and 
decreases afterwards.  
These results comply with intuition. The CNB has the power to steer the interest rate as its main 
instrument. Hence, the interest rate forecast is mostly credible and its publication reduces the 
uncertainty of private forecasts. As an inflation-targeting central bank, the CNB inflation forecast 
is also considered credible. However, the CNB forecasts for the remaining indicators – the 
exchange rate and GDP – do not have that institutional advantage and their publication does not 
reduce the uncertainty among private forecasters. The highest exchange rate uncertainty at the 
time of publishing the CNB forecast might be explained by higher exchange rate volatility 
surrounding the CNB decision-taking, which coincides with the publication of the forecast. The 
standard deviation of the current and next year GDP forecasts is likely to be heavily influenced by 
statistical releases. A flash estimate of previous quarter GDP is released in February, May, August 
and November and is fully reflected in the March, June, September and December private forecast 
surveys. As such, it influences the standard deviation in the second month after the CNB forecast 
publication. Similarly, the release of national account statistics might have an influence on the 
standard deviation of private forecasts in the month before the CNB forecast is published.  
 14   Jan Filáček, Branislav Saxa 
 
   
In addition to the graphical analysis, we also run t-tests. The test results summarized in Table 1 
show that we can reject the null hypothesis of no change or increase against the alternative 
hypothesis of a decrease in the standard deviation after the release of the forecast at a 5% level of 
significance only in the case of interest rates.  
 
Table 1: Hypothesis Testing: The Null Hypothesis of No Change or Increase against the 
Alternative Hypothesis of a Decrease of the Standard Deviation of Private Forecasts 
after the Release of the CNB Forecast 
 







Interest rate 31 0.25 0.23 0.04 **
Inflation 31 0.45 0.42 0.14
Exchange rate 31 0.62 0.65 0.78
GDP current year 25 0.26 0.27 0.71






     Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
The second part of our analysis is focused on the median absolute distance of private forecasts 
from the CNB forecast.
5 Theoretically, if coordination exists, this distance should narrow after the 
CNB forecast is published and then broaden again as new information arrives.  
There are at least two drawbacks to this analysis. First, some important pieces of new information 
(e.g., headline inflation, and in some periods also the GDP flash estimates) become available 
immediately after the CNB forecast is released and before the private forecasts are surveyed. This 
might loosen the link between the CNB forecast and the private forecasts. Second, the fact that the 
CNB forecasts quarterly data, whereas the private forecasters reveal expected monthly 
developments, might also negatively influence the link. For example, if we are in the first quarter 
and inflation is expected to rise steadily over the first quarter of the next year, then the private 
forecasts in January are likely to be below the CNB forecast for the first quarter, the private 
forecasts for February should be closer to the CNB forecast and, finally, the March private 
forecasts are likely to be above the CNB forecast. These complications might undervalue our 
estimates. 
Figure 7 shows that the distance between the private forecasts and the CNB forecast decreases 
after the release of the CNB forecast in the case of interest rates, inflation and GDP growth in the 
current year. On the contrary, the distance increases in the case of exchange rates. The distance 
for GDP growth in the next year remains broadly stable.  
 
                                                           
5 Running the analysis with the mean absolute distance yields almost the same results.  Central Bank Forecasts as a Coordination Device   15 
 
 
Figure 7: The Sensitivity of the Median Absolute Distance of Private Forecasts from the CNB 



























































The loose link between the private and CNB forecasts of exchange rates might be explained by 
the idea presented in the two paragraphs above – the exchange rate forecast (and the actual 
exchange rate) is affected by the new information, and this effect is stronger than for the other 
forecasted variables. The private forecasts are continuously updated to include new information 
and actual exchange rate levels, sharply contrasting with the CNB forecasts, which draw on 
exchange rates observed at the beginning of the forecasting process. This idea is supported by 
internal research by the CNB (Syrovátka, 2009) showing that private exchange rate forecasts are 
more precise than the CNB’s forecast. Also, private exchange rate forecasts might reveal self-
fulfilling properties as, for example, forecasting stronger exchange rates might reinforce the 
buying of Czech crown-denominated assets. Finally, we should bear in mind that the CNB started 
to publish exchange rate forecasts only in 2009. Before 2009, the CNB used to reveal only limited 
information about its exchange rate forecasts, typically in the form of vague sentences.
6 Any 
coordination based on such information is dramatically less likely than coordination based on 
available numerical forecasts. 
The distance between the next year’s private GDP growth median forecast and the CNB forecast 
remains almost unchanged in the first month after the release of the CNB forecast. However, in 
the second survey after the release, the distance narrows significantly. It is possible that in the 
case of GDP forecasts for the next year it takes some time to convince the private forecasters 
about the message of the forecast. 
                                                           
6 i.e., the following sentence described the exchange rate forecast in the Inflation Report published in November 
2008: “After initial fluctuations, the nominal exchange rate will again steadily appreciate”. 16   Jan Filáček, Branislav Saxa 
 
   
The results of hypothesis testing in Table 2 complement the graphical presentation. The decrease 
of the absolute distance between the median of the private forecasts and the CNB forecast 
immediately after the release of the latter is statistically significant at the usual significance levels 
in the cases of interest rates and inflation. 
 
Table 2: Hypothesis Testing: The Null Hypothesis of No Change or Increase against the 
Alternative Hypothesis of a Decrease of the Distance between the Private Forecasts 
and the CNB Forecast after the Release of the Latter 
 








Interest rate 31 0.65 0.53 0.00 ***
Inflation 31 0.46 0.38 0.05 *
Exchange rate 31 0.63 0.70 0.91
GDP current year 25 0.30 0.27 0.17





       Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
We continued our analysis by scrutinizing if and how our results change during times of higher 
uncertainty. Quarters were divided into two groups (low and high uncertainty quarters) depending 
on the average standard deviation of the private forecasts over the whole quarter being lower or 
equal on the one hand or greater on the other hand than the average standard deviation. Figure 8 
provides the first view of the relationship between uncertainty and the distance of the CNB 
forecast from the median of the private forecasts. The distance of the CNB forecasts from the 
private forecast median is substantially smaller during high uncertainty periods than at times of 
low uncertainty in the cases of interest rates and exchange rates. On the contrary, in the case of 
GDP forecasts for the current year, the distance is greater in uncertain times. In addition, Figure 8 
shows that under high uncertainty, the distance decreases after the release of the CNB forecast in 
the cases of all five forecasted variables except for the exchange rate. The results of one-sided 
paired t-tests in Tables 3 and 4 show that the decrease of the distance after the release of the CNB 
forecast is statistically significant at the 1% level in the case of interest rates under low 
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Figure 8: The Sensitivity of the Median Absolute Distance of Private Forecasts from the CNB 
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Table 3: Hypothesis Testing: The Null Hypothesis of No Change or Increase against the 
Alternative Hypothesis of a Decrease of the Median Distance of Private Forecasts 
from the CNB Forecast after the Release of the CNB Forecast. Low Uuncertainty 
Environment 







Interest rate 18 0.77 0.62 0.00 ***
Inflation 18 0.44 0.41 0.17
Exchange rate 16 0.72 0.83 0.97
GDP current year 18 0.24 0.23 0.39
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Table 4:  Hypothesis Testing: Null Hypothesis of No Change or Increase against the 
Alternative Hypothesis of a Decrease of the Median Distance of Private Forecasts 
from the CNB Forecast after the Release of the CNB Forecast. High Uncertainty 
Environment 








Interest rate 13 0.48 0.39 0.09 *
Inflation 13 0.49 0.35 0.09 *
Exchange rate 15 0.54 0.55 0.57
GDP current year 7 0.46 0.36 0.17






       Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
In Figure 9, the overall uncertainty is used instead of the uncertainties based on the standard 
deviations of the individual series. Qualitatively, the results differ mainly in the case of the current 
year GDP forecasts. This might reflect the fact that the set of uncertainties surrounding current 
year GDP is often different from the set of uncertainties influencing forecasts at the one year 
horizon.  
Figure 9: The Sensitivity of the Median Absolute Distance of Private Forecasts from the CNB 
Forecast on the Release of the Latter, Depending on Degree of Uncertainty. Overall 
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In the final step, we examine whether the sensitivity of private forecasts to the CNB forecast 
varies with the way the CNB forecast has been communicated. In our sample period, four 
improvements in the CNB forecast communication can be identified. In January 2005 the CNB 
started to publish a detailed decomposition of inflation and GDP forecasts. Since April 2007 
spreadsheets with underlying datasets for all figures and tables in the Inflation Report, including 
the interval forecast for inflation and GDP, have been made available on the CNB website. These 
spreadsheets have newly provided users with very precise information on the CNB forecast. Most 
importantly, forecasts for quarterly GDP became available, whereas only forecasts for annual 
GDP had been published before. In January 2008 the CNB started releasing forecasts for interest 
rates. The CNB also improved the way the forecasts of key variables are communicated and 
introduced fan charts with confidence intervals based on previous forecasting performance. 
Finally, since January 2009 the CNB has also been reporting its exchange rate forecast using 
figures. 
In order to capture the effects of the CNB forecast communication changes on the distance 
between private and CNB forecasts, we introduce four dummy variables for the time period in 
which improved communication has been in place. The dummies are effective only in the first 
months after the CNB forecast is released, since all communication takes place immediately after 
the release. For example, the first communication dummy is named “Decomposition” and has 
value 0 before January 2005 and 1 in all “first after” periods afterwards.  
In this step we introduce several additional variables which might also be helpful in explaining the 
sensitivity of private forecasts to the CNB forecast. The first of these additional variables captures 
actual economic developments and statistical releases in the period between two central bank 
forecasts. Where possible, we construct this variable as the absolute deviation of the actual data 
from the CNB forecast. Where this approach is not feasible, we use the absolute deviation of the 
actual data from the previous statistical release. 
The second additional variable is a dummy which describes the risk assessment of the forecast, as 
discussed at the board meeting and published immediately at the press conference.
7 This dummy 
takes a value of 0 if the risks are perceived as balanced and 1 if risks are either inflationary or 
disinflationary. The logic behind using this variable is that once the board assesses the forecast as 
biased in either direction, the market might also discount the forecast and the coordination effect 
is then expected to be lower. 
Finally, we also construct a dummy exploring the potential coordination role of another influential 
forecaster in the Czech Republic: the Ministry of Finance. Because the Ministry of Finance 
forecast assumes exchange rates and interest rates as being constant, we draw only on the inflation 
and GDP forecast. The dummy is set to 1 if the ministry’s forecast for a given variable differs by 
more than one percentage point from the CNB forecast, and zero in other cases. 
We insert all the explanatory variables into the regression estimating the sensitivity of the median 
absolute distance of private forecasts from the CNB forecast on the release of the latter. The 
regression results are reported in Table 5. 
                                                           
7 Before 2008, there were 12 meetings per year, i.e., the risks of the forecast were reassessed each month. 
Starting from 2008, the number of meetings was reduced to 8 per year.  20   Jan Filáček, Branislav Saxa 
 
   
Table 5: The Effect of Changes in Communication, Actual Economic Developments, Risk 
Assessment and the Forecast of the Ministry of Finance on the Median Absolute 
Distance of Private Forecasts from the CNB Forecast 
 
 
Last before 0.58 *** 0.51 *** 0.71 *** 0.31 *** 0.49 ***
[0.08] [0.07] [0.09] [0.09] [0.11]
First after 0.29 *** 0.22 *** 0.46 *** 0.21 * 0.48 ***
[0.09] [0.05] [0.16] [0.11] [0.11]
Second after 0.44 *** 0.36 *** 0.76 *** 0.28 *** 0.41 ***
[0.09] [0.07] [0.11] [0.08] [0.10]
Surprise 0.62 * -0.15 -0.23 0.09 ** 0.02
[0.32] [0.09] [0.15] [0.04] [0.08]
Decomposition 0.19 0.11 0.64 *** 0.08 -0.06
[0.18] [0.11] [0.14] [0.12] [0.12]
Spreadsheets 0.20 0.23 * -0.16 *** 0.21 *0 . 1 7
[0.26] [0.14] [0.06] [0.12] [0.13]
IR forecast -0.06 -0.28 ** -0.45 ** -0.32 *** -0.21
[0.32] [0.11] [0.20] [0.12] [0.20]
ER forecast -0.26 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.14
[0.30] [0.15] [0.22] [0.15] [0.24]
Risk assessment 0.03 0.12 * 0.15 -0.02 0.05
[0.10] [0.07] [0.11] [0.08] [0.09]
Ministry of Finance 0.12 0.49 *** 0.11
[0.09] [0.12] [0.17]
Approaching end-of-the-year 0.01 0.00
[0.01] [0.01]
Number of observations 93 89 93 75 75
R
2 0.74 0.72 0.79 0.76 0.69
Dependent variable
GDP next year Interest rate Inflation Exchange rate GDP current year
 
Notes:   Dependent variables are the median absolute distances of private forecasts from the CNB forecast 
for the respective variables. Last before, First after and Second after are time dummies 
corresponding to the respective round of private forecasts. Surprise is the difference between the 
two most recent monthly values in the case of the interest rate and the exchange rate, the difference 
between the recent monthly value and the CNB forecast in the case of inflation and the difference 
between the two most recent GDP growth quarterly values in the case of GDP (set to zero in the 
months without a new release).  Decomposition, Spreadsheats, IR forecast and ER forecast are 
dummies equal to one in the “first after“ period since the respective changes in communication 
were introduced. Risk assesment is a dummy equal to one if the  board´s assessment of the risks is 
non-neutral. Ministry of Finance is a dummy equal to one if the forecasts of the CNB and the 
Ministry of Finance differ by more than 1 perc. point for the respective variables. Approaching 
end-of-the year is a trend variable controlling for decreasing uncertainty about the yearly figure in 
the case of GDP forecasts. Statistical significance: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%; robust standard errors in brackets. 
  
 
The estimated coefficients of the dummies connected with our three sets of private forecasts (last 
before, first after, second after) show, compared to Figure 7, a more pronounced decline after the 
release of the CNB forecast in the cases of the interest rate, inflation, the exchange rate and 
current year GDP. Thus, adding more explanatory variables makes the coordination effect more 
pronounced. The first additional variable, entitled Surprise, captures the effect of actual economic 
developments. These are influential and come with the correct sign for the interest rate and current 
year GDP – the bigger the surprise, the bigger the distance of private forecasts from the CNB 
forecast. The next four rows of Table 5 contain dummies capturing the communication effects 
(Decomposition, Spreadsheets, IR forecast and ER forecast). Higher coordination effects of Central Bank Forecasts as a Coordination Device   21 
 
 
central bank forecasts should be revealed by negative estimates of regression coefficients. The 
communication shifts have significant and intuitive effects only in the cases of inflation 
(publishing interest rate forecast), the exchange rate (publishing spreadsheets and interest rate 
forecasts) and current year GDP (publishing interest rate forecasts). In the case of other variables 
and communication dummies, no effects or adverse effects are identified. The risk assessment is 
slightly significant only for inflation. This seems intuitive because the risks of the forecast are 
assessed mainly for inflation and verbally described as inflationary or disinflationary. At times 
when the current year GDP forecast of the Ministry of Finance differs from the CNB forecast by 
more than one percentage point, private forecasts tend to move away from the CNB forecast, with 
no similar effect being observable in the cases of next year GDP and inflation. 
In addition, we investigated whether the past accuracy of central bank forecasts strengthens the 
coordination effect. A proxy for the relative past accuracy of central bank and median private 
forecasts
8 was included in the previous regression. The coefficient of the proxy was significant for 
inflation and GDP in the current year. Its sign and size suggest that private forecasters evaluate 
the past accuracy of central bank forecasts and tend to use these forecasts for coordination more 





We investigated the possibility that private forecasters coordinate their forecasts through the 
forecast of the central bank, in this case the CNB. When looking at the evolution of standard 
deviation, only the standard deviation of the individual forecasts of interest rates decreases 
significantly after the release of the CNB forecast. When looking at the distance of the median of 
private forecasts from the CNB forecast, the forecasts of the interest rate and inflation show a 
significant decrease in the distance after the release of the CNB forecast. Finally, in search of the 
effects of uncertainty, we find that the distance of the median of private forecasts from the CNB 
forecast tends to be smaller during times of high uncertainty compared to times of low uncertainty 
in the cases of the interest rate and the exchange rate. 
                                                           
8 In the first step, the absolute accuracy was calculated for both the central bank and private forecasters as the 
absolute difference between the forecasted and actual values. The moving average of the ratio of the two 
accuracy measures including the past 12 months was then constructed and used as a proxy for relative accuracy:  
∑
= − − − −





















accuracy past  
where 
Ffm
i t i t X − − − , 12 and 
Fcb
i t i t X − − − , 12  are one-year ahead forecasts made by the financial markets (median) and the 
central bank 12+i months ago, and 
A
i t X − is the actual outcome available at the time i months ago. 
9 Due to a substantial decrease in the number of usable observations caused by the calculation of past accuracy, 
we consider the results presented in Table 5 to be preferable. The results with past accuracy among the 
explanatory variables are not reported and can be obtained upon request. 22   Jan Filáček, Branislav Saxa 
 
   
While the forecasts of the interest rate and inflation provide relatively strong support for the 
theory of coordination via central bank forecasts, the GDP and exchange rate forecasts provide 
almost no support. However, these results comply with intuition. The CNB has the power to steer 
the interest rate as its main instrument. Hence, the interest rate forecast is mostly credible and its 
publication reduces the uncertainty of private forecasts. As an inflation-targeting central bank, the 
CNB inflation forecast is also considered credible. However, the CNB forecasts for the remaining 
indicators – the exchange rate and GDP – do not have that institutional advantage and their 
publication does not reduce the uncertainty among private forecasters. 
We analysed the effects of changes in forecast communication in more detail and found that 
communication has supported the coordination of private forecasters in the case of inflation 
(publishing interest rate forecasts), the exchange rate (publishing spreadsheets and interest rate 
forecasts) and current year GDP (publishing interest rate forecasts). Furthermore, actual economic 
developments have an impact on the interest rate and current year GDP forecasts. The GDP 
forecasts are also influenced by the Ministry of Finance forecast. Finally, the forecast for inflation 
is sensitive to the risk assessment made by the CNB’s board members. 
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